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WALT WHITMAN AND THE CULTURE OF 
PRAGMATISM 
DANIEL S. MALACHUK 
IN HIS 1955 BIOGRAPHY of Walt Whitman, The Solitary Singer, Gay Wil-
son Allen wrote that "Whitman's language and his thinking were awk-
ward [in Democratic Vistas] ... because ... he was exploring problems 
and presenting empirical answers that actually gave a preview of the 
main course of American philosophy for the next century[.] [F] or what," 
Allen suggested, "was this theory of 'Democracy' but the forerunner of 
William James's 'Pluralism' and John Dewey's 'Pragmatism'?"! Look-
ing closely at William James's work in particular, one might make even 
stronger claims about Whitman's catalytic role in the genesis of prag-
matism. Occasionally in his lectures on pragmatism, James suggests that 
Whitman is a pragmatist forerunner; and in fact he frequently draws 
upon Whitman to make arguments for the pluralistic worldview that for 
James went hand in hand with the philosophy of pragmatism. But 
Whitman's role may have been even more important, for there is evi-
dence that it was Whitman's writing (in part) that first persuaded James 
to become a pragmatist. In other words, James used Whitman to per-
suade others to become pragmatists because it was Whitman himself 
who had persuaded James to become a pragmatist. Following an exami-
nation of this double role of Whitman's writing within the early history 
of pragmatism, this essay concludes with a discussion of the contempo-
rary pragmatist Richard Rorty's use of Whitman, suggesting the poet's 
enduring importance to the culture of pragmatism. 
In 1905, when James began to plan the lectures that he would de-
liver in 1906 and publish as Pragmatism in 1907, he jotted down these 
notes for himself: "Discuss ... absolutism; demolish it. Set up plural-
ism as alternative."2 The lectures were slightly more subtle in approach, 
but it is important to recall just how passionately James believed in the 
pragmatist's pluralistic worldview-and how passionately absolutists of 
all stripes feared it. The point of contention between these two camps 
was the nature of truth, which led in turn to debates about the nature of 
the universe and our place within it. If, as James and the other pluralis-
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tic pragmatists said, the universe was really pluralist, full of divergent 
experiences that no single truth-like God, or the One, or Being-could 
explain, was not truth itself, then, just something forged by humans for 
temporary use? So the absolutists worried, wondering what was to keep 
each of us-with our private temporary truths-from killing one other. 
Bertrand Russell argued this way in a famous essay he wrote in response 
to James's book. "[A]lthough it begins with liberty and toleration," 
Russell wrote, pragmatism "develops by inherent necessity into the ap-
peal to force and [to] the big battalions."3 Another popular-science writer 
of the time, Edwin Slosson, linked James's pragmatism not to imperial-
ism but to a breakdown of social order. "[T] he pragmatic method is like 
the invention of gunpowder," Slosson argued; "[i]n careless hands it 
may lead to intellectual anarchy."4 
James, too, believed that pragmatism was a modern invention of 
world-historical significance, but one not at all like imperialism or anar-
chy. As he wrote to his brother Henry in 1907: 
I have just finisht the proofs of a.little book called 'pragmatism' which even you may 
enjoy reading .... [1]n the midst of the literature of the way of thinking which it repre-
sents, ... [it will] be treated later as 'representative.' I shouldn't be surprised if 10 years 
hence it should be rated as 'epoch-making,' for of the definitive triumph of that general 
way of thinking I can entertain no doubt whatever-1 believe it to be something quite 
like the protestant reformation. 5 
So, even if James occasionally liked to say that pragmatism was techni-
cally just "a new name for an old way of thinking" (the modest subtitle 
to Pragmatism), he and many others really understood the philosophy of 
pragmatism to represent the crystallization of a way of thinking about 
the world, a culture, that was distinctly new: dedicated to the empirical, 
disdainful of absolutes and their systems, and relentlessly practical. For 
James, it w'as a culture worth fighting for. "I didn't know, until 1 came 
to prepare them," James wrote a friend while revising his lectures, "how 
full of power to found a 'school' and to become a 'cause,' the pragma-
tistic idea was. But now 1 am all aflame with it ... and 1 mean to turn 
the lectures into a solid little cube of a book ... which will, 1 am confi-
dent, make the pragmatic method appear ... as the philosophy of the 
future."6 
The lectures themselves were a smashing success, drawing over 
five hundred people to their first reading in Boston at the end of 1906, 
and, a month later, over one thousand people to a reading at Columbia 
University. Still, James was acutely aware that many people-including 
members of his audiences-remained wary of pragmatism. So, even as 
he presented the early lectures in the series, he revised the later ones 
feverishly to address new fears that came up. One major fear of his audi-
ence was that the pragmatist's test of use for truths might determine 
that belief in God was useless. As James stated in this last lecture, "Prag-
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matism and Religion," "my previous lectures ... may have left the im-
pression on many of you that pragmatism means methodically to leave 
the superhuman out." In this final lecture, he therefore hoped to show 
that pragmatism actually does see a use for a "melioristic type of the-
ism" between "the two extremes of crude naturalism ... and transcen-
dental absolutism," a religion-James promised-that "is exactly what 
you require."7 Thus James began this last lecture anxious to persuade 
his audience that pragmatism did not rule out religious possibilities or 
even belief in an Absolute, admitting that "the use of the Absolute is 
proved by the whole course of men's religious history. "8 He then quotes 
Whitman. 
At this point, it is important to recall that Whitman criticism in 
1906, as Charles Willard describes in Whitman's American Fame, was 
defined by two poles: one that claimed he was a second-rate poet of 
sensuality, the other a first-rate genius of universal oneness, of absolut-
ism.9 In the decade following his death in 1892, the notion of Whitman 
as the bard of the Absolute was championed in particular by a band of 
followers-including R. M. Bucke and Horace Traubel-who saw Whit-
man as nothing less than the nineteenth-century Christ. Therefore when 
James begins to read thirty lines from Whitman's "To You" immedi-
ately after conceding that the Absolute had its uses in the past, his audi-
ence must have assumed that James was reading Whitman-as Bucke 
and Traubel did-as an absolutist. The last five of the lines · that James 
read were the following: 
Whoever you are! claim your own at any hazard! 
The hopples fall from your ankles-you find an unfailing sufficiency; 
Old or young, male or female, rude, low, rejected by the rest, whatever you are 
promulges itself; 
Through birth, life, death, burial, the means are provided, nothing is scanted; 
Through anger, losses, ambition, ignorance, ennui, what you are picks its way. 10 
A testament of faith in an "unfailing sufficiency," this poem no doubt 
led James's audience to believe they were to hear about the pragmatistic 
use of belief in an Absolute. 11 
However, concluding his reading, James instead announces that, 
actually, "there are two ways of taking [the poem], both useful," one of 
which is indeed that of the absolutist, which James then summarizes: 
"The glories and grandeurs, they are yours absolutely, even in the midst 
of defacements. Whatever may happen to you, whatever you may ap-
pear to be, inwardly you are safe. Look back, lie back, on your true 
principle ofbeing!"12 Then James introduces a second way: 
But pragmatism sees another way to be respected also, the pluralistic way of interpret-
ing the poem. The you so glorified ... may mean your better possibilities phenomenally 
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taken .. . . Forget the low in yourself, then, think only of the high ... . [T]hrough an-
gers, losses, ignorance, ennui, whatever you thus make yourself, whatever you thus 
most deeply are, picks its way. 13 
Here James echoes Whitman's "picks its way" to reinforce his own point 
about life within a pluralistic universe. Whitman's poem is not really 
about that absolute faith in "the static One," as James puts it; it is about 
picking moments from life, about seeing, as James says, "possibles in 
the plural, genuine possibles, ... [with] all the restlessness of that con-
ception."14 This latter view, James concludes, is that of the pragmatist: 
Noble enough is either way of reading the poem; but plainly the pluralistic way agrees 
with the pragmatic temper best .... It sets definite activities in us at work. Altho this 
second way seems prosaic and earth-born in comparison with the first way, yet no one 
can accuse it of tough-mindedness in any brutal sense of the term. 15 
James began this lecture with Whitman's poem in order to con-
vince his audience that pragmatism means neither a "brutal" or "tough-
minded" practicality, a surrender to the law of the jungle as Russell 
would claim, nor a passive worship of universal oneness. Instead, prag-
matism means "restlessly" approaching the world as full of possibilities, 
none of them finalized, many of them available "to you." In this lecture 
from Pragmatism, in short, James relies upon Whitman's contemporary 
reputation as a mystic to ease his audience-frightened by a pragma-
tism associated with godless means-end thinking-from their own lazy 
absolutism into the more modern, pluralistic worldview of melioristic 
or progressive pragmatism. 
• 
This is the way James used Whitman in Pragmatism, because this is 
how, I believe, James himself had learned to read Whitman over the 
previous forty years. The first published reference to Whitman by James 
is in a letter to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in 1868, when James was 
only twenty-six. It is highly possible that James knew of Whitman even 
earlier. In 1865, when James was twenty-three, his brother Henry re-
viewed Drum-Taps (quite negatively) in the Nation. 16 Indeed, James may 
have heard of Whitman as early as 1855, when he was a precocious 
thirteen-year-old and his father's friend, Emerson, greeted the poet at 
the beginning of his career with his .famous letter. James was also close 
friends with two slightly older men who were among Whitman's earliest 
reviewers: Charles Eliot Norton and William Dean Howells. I7 In any 
case, James clearly knew Whitman by the mid-to-Iate 1860s, a time 
·when Whitman, as Charles Willard notes, was "a familiar figure in Wash-
ington streets ... [but] still practically unknown as a writer."18 
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Looking back over those forty years of James's writings about Whit-
man, one can see significant changes in his understanding of the poet. 
In 1868, Holmes wrote James of the arrival of spring and all its plea-
sures, e.g., "[t]he icy teeth have melted out of the air .... Now are the 
waters beneath my window of a deeper ... blue .... Now couples ... 
draw near to each other in the dark spaces between the gas lights and 
think themselves unseen."19 Young James empathizes in his response, 
including in his description of his surroundings some randy remarks 
about a nearby woman washing windows. James's specific reference to 
Whitman seems mostly to allude to the erotic portion of Holmes's let-
ter: "heaven reward you for this inspired effusion .... It runs through 
the whole circle of human energy, Shelley, Kant, Goethe, Walt Whit-
man, all being fused in the unity of your fiery personality. "20 
Beginning with his first published essays in the 1870s, James relies 
on a Whitman who is no longer the Sensualist but the Absolutist. In an 
unsigned 1875 Nation review entitled "German Pessimism," James writes 
that while Schopenhauer and others like him might "exert a spell over 
persons in the unwholesome sentimental moulting-time of youth ... 
the existence ofa Walt Whitman confounds Schopenhauer."21 Describ-
ing this absolute optimism again in an 1879 essay, "The Sentiment of 
Rationality," James writes that "we are in a sort of anaesthetic state in 
which we might say with Walt Whitman, if we cared to say anything 
about ourselves at such times, 'I am sufficient as I am. "'22 In the 1892 
lecture "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings," James dedicated 
nearly a quarter of his lecture to explaining how Whitman, the "hoary 
loafer," was able "simply to absorb [his] mind" in "the human crowd."23 
And in the opening pages of the 1895 "Is Life Worth Living?," James 
begins this way: 
With many men the question of life's worth is answered by a temperamental optimism 
which makes them incapable of believing that anything seriously evil can exist. Our dear 
old Walt Whitman's works are the standing text-book of this kind of optimism. The 
mere joy ofliving is so immense in Walt Whitman's veins that it abolishes the possibility 
of any other kind of feeling. 24 
James then declaims thirteen lines from "Song at Sunset" (e.g., "To 
breathe the air, how delicious!"; "To be this incredible God I am!") 
and concludes that Whitman's soul was "incapable ... of gloom. "25 
Sometime around 1900, however, James's view of Whitman changed 
once more. Writing the lectures later to become The Varieties of Reli-
gious Experience, James seems to have discovered that Whitman's opti-
mism was not at all temperamental, but hard-won, involving the diffi-
cult work of picking the right details from the intense pluralism of expe-
rience. In the lecture "The Religion of Healthy-Mindedness," for ex-
ample, James begins by citing a passage from Bucke's book Cosmic Con-
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sciousness, arguing that anger and like emotions were simply absent in 
Whitman. But James then comments that "Walt Whitman owes his 
importance in literature to the systematic expulsion from his writings of 
all contractile elements."26 James goes on to criticize not only this wor-
ship of Whitman as a perfect Christ (and he refers to Traubel's The 
Conservator) but also the reduction of Whitman to a "pagan" (alluding 
here to George Santayana's attack on Whitman and Robert Browning 
in his recent book, Poetry of Religion). Whitman is no Christ, James ar-
gues, nor is he a pagan: he is more than "your mere animal man who 
has not tasted of the tree of good and evil." Whitman, James points out, 
"is aware enough of sin for a swagger to be present in his indifference 
towards it, a conscious pride in his freedom from flexions and contrac-
tions, which your genuine pagan ... would never show."27 Whitman's 
"optimism is ... voluntary and defiant," and "his gospel has a touch of 
bravado and an affected twist. "28 In a letter to a friend from the same 
time, James objected to Santayana's conclusion that the realism of con-
temporary poetry represented a barbaric betrayal of poetry's represen-
tation of the ideal: 
Dramatic unities; laws of versification; ... scholastic doctrines. Bah! Give me Walt 
Whitman ... ten times over .... The barbarians are in the line of mental growth, and 
those who do insist that the ideal and the real are dynamically continuous are those by 
whom the world is to be saved.29 
Quite aware, then, of both the deification and paganization schools of 
Whitman critics, James boldly takes Whitman in another non-absolut-
ist, pragmatist direction, arguing that the poet's deliberate selection of 
possibles from the welter of human experience is prototypically mod-
em, the start of a second reformation. Whitman is, in short, the kind of 
person "by whom the world is to be saved": the pragmatist. 
Over the last thirty years, Richard Rorty has been the philosopher most 
responsible for pragmatism's new popularity, and it is instructive to com-
pare his strategies to those of William James. Like James, Rorty only 
gradually persuaded people that pragmatism is the rightful tool of nei-
ther relativistic war-mongers nor absolutist (nowadays postmodemist) 
mystics but of progressive reformers; also like James, Rorty only gradu-
ally recognized Whitman as just the writer to help him make this case. 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, when Rorty used philosophers like 
Heidegger rather than poets like Whitman to present pragmatism as an 
antifoundationalist philosophy, the progressive power of his pragma-
tism was frequently contested by critics. In 1982, when Rorty explained 
antifoundationalist pragmatism as "offer[ing] a view on pretty much 
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anything, in the hope of making it hang together with everything else," 
critics responded as they once did to James: that this is either an apol-
ogy for the warrior's status quo (in this case the Cold War warrior) or a 
retreat into postmodern escapism, or what Rorty unfortunately called 
in 1983 his "Post-Modernist Bourgeois Liberalism."30 In 1987, when 
Rorty confessed his regret for having used the term postmodernism to 
describe his pragmatism, and began to link his pragmatism more spe-
cifically to "social democra[cy]," his ambitions for the philosophy were 
still very modest: the social democrat was someone who cherished lib-
eral institutions in the face of Soviet imperialism, especially when "time 
seems to be on the Soviet side. "31 As it turned out, time was not on the 
Soviet side, and when 1989 brought the abrupt disappearance of com-
munism in Eastern Europe, Rorty's pragmatism was at best only mildly 
progressive, concerned with promoting what he called the "liberal 
ironist," who spent his time privately "redescribing" himself since J. S. 
Mill had said "pretty much the last word" about public life in a liberal 
democracy. 32 
Since the end of the Cold War, however, Rorty has increasingly 
argued that there is in fact still work to do in the liberal public sphere. 
More and more, he has championed the progressive power of pragma-
tism, and he has learned-like James-to enlist Whitman in his cause. 
In a 1995 address to the MLA convention in Chicago, Rorty defended 
"The Inspirational Value of Great Works" against the "knowingness" 
ofpostmodern literary critics. Just as James once used Whitman to chal-
lenge self-satisfied absolutists to consider the power of pragmatism to 
pick its way through a pluralistic universe, Rorty used Whitman to chal-
lenge those "taking refuge in self-protective knowingness" to consider 
the power of a "pragmatist functionalism" that views literature as 
"mak[ing] people think there is more to this life than they ever imag-
ined. "33 In a 1997 essay, "Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility, 
and Romance," Rorty defends the idea of "romance" as "a faith in the 
future possibility of mortal humans, a faith which is hard to distinguish 
from love for, and hope for, the human community," calling this ro-
mance in conclusion the "Whitmanesque dream of plural, democratic 
vistas. "34 In a 1998 forum of public intellectuals in American Literary 
History, Rorty described his own vocation to write for "fellow citizens" 
as "Whitmanesque. "35 
But Rorty's most substantial and compelling use of Whitman is to 
be found in his 1997 William E. Massey, Sr., lectures in the history of 
American civilization, published in 1998. Here Rorty argues that the 
American political left has become nearly as fundamentalist or absolut-
ist as the American right. Where too many on the right see America as 
part of God's divine plan, too many on the left, particularly the cultural 
left dominated by postmodern theories like Foucault's, see America 
determined entirely by an insidious "power." Both right and left are 
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consequently trapped in "gothic" worldviews entirely of their own mak-
ing. Like James, Rorty has set out to define a pragmatism that will de-
molish these absolutist delusions and focus instead on genuine possibles. 
And, like James, Rorty finds the great voice for this pragmatist program 
in Whitman. In the first lecture, "American National Pride: Whitman 
and Dewey," Rorty writes that "Whitman viewed the United States as 
an opportunity to see ultimate significance in a finite, human, historical 
project, rather than in something eternal and nonhuman .... [He] 
wanted that utopian America to replace God as the unconditional ob-
ject of desire." Rorty goes on to quote from Democratic Vistas that "de-
mocracy ... is a great word, whose history ... remains unwritten, be-
cause that history has yet to be enacted. "36 
Like James, Rorty finds Whitman useful for teaching Americans a 
different kind of religion, one that sits somewhere between a crude, 
brutal naturalism and a passive, gothic absolutism. Even more than 
James, Rorty depends upon Whitman to vivify the progressive spirit of 
true pragmatism. As he was at the beginning of this century, Whitman 
seems once again at its end to be an indispensable voice of the culture of 
pragmatism. 
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